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Barcelona Traction at 40: The ICJ as an Agent
of Legal Development
CHRISTIAN J. TAMS AND ANTONIOS TZANAKOPOULOS∗
Abstract
The article revisits the Barcelona Traction judgment of the International Court of Justice,
rendered forty years ago. It evaluates the lasting inﬂuence of the Court’s pronouncements
on the nationality of corporations and on obligations erga omnes, and uses the case to illustrate
theCourt’s role as an inﬂuential agent of legal development. In this respect, it identiﬁes a num-
ber of factors that can help to explain under which circumstances judicial pronouncements
are likely to shape the law.
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Forty years ago, on 5 February 1970, the International Court of Justice (ICJ, the
Court) rendered its ﬁnal judgment in the Barcelona Traction case between Belgium
and Spain.1 This brought to an end proceedings spanning 12 years,2 during which
the parties had produced approximately 60,000 pages of written documents.3 For a
variety of reasons (and not just its length), this was a remarkable case: it was a case
about ‘big business’ andhostile takeovers; oneof the (not somany) ICJ decisions that
was widely reported not only in specialist publications, but also in the press and in
general law journals.4 Moreover, it was a case that ended in a notable anticlimax,
when the Court surprisingly upheld one of Spain’s preliminary objections and
∗ Christian J. Tams is Professor of International Law, University of Glasgow [christian.tams@glasgow.ac.uk];
Antonios Tzanakopoulos is Lecturer in international law, University of Glasgow [antonios.tzanakopoulos@
glasgow.ac.uk].
1 CaseConcerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and PowerCo. Ltd (NewApplication: 1962) (Belgiumv. Spain) (Second
Phase), [1970] ICJ Rep. 3 (hereafter Barcelona Traction).
2 For a summary of the case history see ibid., at 6, paras. 1–3; S.Wittich, ‘Barcelona TractionCase’, in R.Wolfrum
(ed.),Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (2007), paras. 4–5.
3 See the estimates put forward byM. Ragazzi, The Concept of International Obligations Erga Omnes (1997), 10, at
n. 44; and J. Sette-Camara, ‘Behind theWorld Bench’, in International Law – Liber Amicorum Eduardo Jime´nez
de Are´chaga (1994), 1069, at 1071.
4 See, e.g., D. Guggenheim, ‘Le droit et le titre en matie`re d’actions et l’affaire de la Barcelona Traction’, (1971)
67 Schweizerische Juristen-Zeitung 71; W.Wengler, ‘Die Aktivlegitimation zum vo¨lkerrechtlichen Schutz von
Vermo¨gensanlagen juristischer Personen im Ausland’, (1970) 34Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1473. See also
J. Brook’s long feature essay ‘Annals of Finance: Privateer’, an eminently readable account of the Barcelona
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 02 Apr 2012 IP address: 130.209.6.42
782 CHRISTIAN J. TAMS AND ANTONIOS TZANAKOPOULOS
declared the case inadmissible; this rather clearly brought out the cumbersome
nature of dispute settlement by the ICJ.
But, of course, Barcelona Traction is remarkablemainly because, in its judgment of
5 February 1970, the Court made two crucial pronouncements on the questions of
law enforcement: by 15 votes to 1, it denied Belgium’s right to bring proceedings on
behalf of a company that was controlled by Belgian shareholders but incorporated
under Canadian law, holding that for the purposes of diplomatic protection the
Barcelona Traction company did not possess Belgian nationality. And as if that were
not enough, it also noted (in passing, but by no means accidentally) that while
nationality governed claims of diplomatic protection, it was irrelevant where states
sought to enforce obligations owed to ‘the international community as a whole’ –
which it called ‘obligations erga omnes’.
These two pronouncements have caused much debate and confusion, and con-
tinue to be discussed in literature and jurisprudence. The subsequent sections add
to the existing literature, but do so from a speciﬁc perspective. They look at the
Court’s two crucial holdings (on nationality of corporations and obligations erga
omnes) from the perspective of judicial lawmaking, and in this respect put forward
two related claims. First, we argue that, while from a dispute settlement perspective
the Court’s handling of the case was disappointing, the Barcelona Traction judg-
ment illustrates theCourt’s inﬂuence on the development of international law.And,
second, we submit that Barcelona Traction helps us to gain an understanding of the
conditions under which international courts and tribunals can act as ‘agents’ of
legal development. This requires some brief introductory comments on the notion
of ‘judge-made (international) law’ (section 1). Section 2 then traces the Court’s two
main holdings and their continuing relevance. Finally, section 3 attempts to artic-
ulate some basic lessons that Barcelona Traction yields with respect to the Court’s
potential contribution to the development of international law.
1. THE ISSUE: COURTS AS AGENTS OF LEGAL DEVELOPMENT
1.1. Conﬂicting assumptions about ‘judicial lawmaking’
Whether courts are supposed to make or develop the law, as opposed to merely
applying it, is oneof (international) law’s perennial questions.5 Likemanyperennial
questions, it eschews a simple answer. Debates typically proceed on the basis of two
commonly shared assumptions.
Traction’s history and a gripping account of the life of JuanMarch, the Spanish entrepreneur proﬁting from
the hostile takeover (New Yorker, 21 May 1979, 42, and 28May 1979, 42).
5 H. Lauterpacht, The Development of International Law by the International Court (1958), 21. Of course, one can
always claim that each application of law, each judgment, is also ‘either a step forward or a step backward
in the development of the law’, as doesM. Lachs, ‘Some Reﬂections on the Contribution of the International
Court of Justice to the Development of International Law’, (1983) 10 Syracuse Journal of International Law and
Commerce 239, at 241.How to determinewhether the step is a big or a small one, andwhat counts as ‘forward’
and ‘backward’, remains a singularly difﬁcult endeavour; see A. Pellet, ‘Article 38’, in A. Zimmermann et al.
(eds.), The Statute of the International Court of Justice – A Commentary (2006), 677, at 789 (mn. 316 in ﬁne).
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The ﬁrst assumption is that international courts have no express legislative
mandate.6 This is frequently acknowledged,7 and it should not come as a surprise.
Wary of activist judges, states have often attempted to circumscribe the judicial role
rather narrowly by including safeguard clauses in the constitutional documents of
international courts and tribunals.8 The Statute of the ICJ is no exception. Nothing
in it empowers the Court to make or develop law.9 Its decisions are binding only
between the parties and in respect of the particular dispute.10 They are not formal
sources of law but, at best, ‘material’ ones – meaning that whatever ‘law’ can be
found in themmust be anchored in a formal source to be binding and applicable in
the relationships between states other than the parties to the dispute.11
The second common assumption is that even without a legislative mandate,
the Court, through its decisions, can inﬂuence international law. In fact, it seems
largely agreed that, in practice, its contribution to the formation and development
of international law is immense.12 Again, this is not surprising. The International
Court of Justice is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, and its de-
cisions are bound to have signiﬁcant repercussions beyond the strict conﬁnes of
the question before it. The Court refers (almost exclusively) to itself and will only
break fromits lineof jurisprudence in rather exceptional circumstances;13 states and
their lawyers rely on ICJ case law in formulating claims, treating it as authoritative
on the existing law;14 scholars seek to ground their arguments in ICJ decisions;15
the International Law Commission (ILC) draws on the Court’s jurisprudence when
codifying international law.16 The UN General Assembly stated early on that the
6 The subsequent considerations focus on theCourt’s contentious jurisdiction.Whether theCourt has greater
leeway to develop international law through its advisory function is a separate matter, addressed, e.g., by
Lachs, supra note 5, at 246–62; and J. A. Frowein and K. Oellers-Frahm, ‘Article 65’, in Zimmermann et al.,
supra note 5, 1420 (mn. 316).
7 See, e.g., Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion), [1996] ICJ Rep. 226 (hereafter
Nuclear Weapons), at 237, para. 18; Interpretation of Peace Treaties (Second Phase), [1950] ICJ Rep. 221, at 244
(Judge Read, Dissenting Opinion); C. G.Weeramantry, ‘The Function of the International Court of Justice in
the Development of International Law’, (1997) 10 LJIL 309, at 311.
8 Themost prominent example in point is Art. 3(2) of theWTODispute Settlement Understanding, pursuant
to which ‘[r]ecommendations and rulings of the [WTO Dispute Settlement Body] cannot add to or diminish
the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements’.Within the context of international criminal
law, the reliance on ‘elements of crime’ (agreed between states, and intended to ‘assist the Court in the
interpretation and application’ of the law (Art. 9)) presents a variant on the same theme.
9 Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) (Merits), [1982] ICJ Rep. 143, at 152 (Judge Gros, Dissenting
Opinion).
10 ICJ Statute, Art. 59.
11 Ibid. and Art. 38(1)(d). See also Lauterpacht, supra note 5, at 22.
12 A. Boyle and C. Chinkin, The Making of International Law (2007), 268; Lauterpacht, supra note 5, at 5; R.
Bernhardt, ‘Article 59’, in Zimmermann et al., supra note 5, 1231 at 1244 (mn. 46–7); Pellet, supra note 5, at
790 (mn. 319).
13 Lauterpacht, supra note 5, at 9–20; M. Mendelson, ‘The International Court of Justice and the Sources of
International Law’, in V. Lowe andM. Fitzmaurice (eds.), Fifty Years of the International Court of Justice – Essays
in Honour of Sir Robert Jennings (1996), 63, at 81; R. Bernhardt, ‘Article 59’, in Zimmermann et al., supra note 5,
1231, at 1244 (mn. 46).
14 Lauterpacht, supra note 5, at 14; Bernhardt, supra note 12, at 1244 (mn. 47).
15 Bernhardt, supra note 12, at 1244 (mn. 47).
16 Obvious examples include the question of reservations to treaties (see Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties (VCLT), Arts. 19–20) or questions dealt with in Articles on the Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001) UN Doc. A/56/10 (ASR), such as that of attribution of conduct of
individuals to states (Art. 8) and proportionality as a limit to countermeasures (Art. 51).
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Court should be ‘utilized to the greatest practicable extent in the progressive devel-
opment of international law’.17 Even the Court itself (always formally denying that
it can act as a legislator18) has acknowledged that its decisions have implications
for the relations between states other than the parties to a dispute before it,19 quite
apart from a number of its judges having clearly taken a position in favour of the
Court developing or making international law, whether in separate and dissenting
opinions,20 orwriting in an extrajudicial capacity.21 As a result of these factors, there
are areas of substantive international lawwhich canhardly beunderstoodwithout a
knowledge of theCourt’s case law: any student of international law seeking to assess
the state of the law on questions such as the use of force, maritime delimitation,
or the legal personality of international organizations will immediately be referred
to the landmark ICJ decision on thematter, which is seen as an accurate expression
of ‘the law’.
On the face of it, the two assumptions seem difﬁcult to reconcile. One way of
addressingthetensionbetweenthemis todistinguishbetweenthetheoryandreality
of international lawmaking–hencesomecommentatorssuggest thatwhile it should
not do so, the Court in reality does ‘make’ or ‘develop’ the law.22 Yet that in itself is
simplistic.Amoreappropriatewayofexplaining the roleof theCourtmaybe toview
its pronouncements as contributions to the process of legal development and norm
creation. As the above-mentioned examples illustrate, in a system relying on treaty-
making and ‘amorphous processes of state practice and opinio juris’,23 the potential
contribution of judicial decisions is considerable:24 through its jurisprudence, the
ICJ can clarify the content of unwritten law, whether custom or general principle; it
canadvanceaparticular interpretationofa treaty; it canﬁll gaps in the lawbyrelying
on analogous reasoning; it can reﬁne existing principles through their clariﬁcation
or modiﬁcation, or the carving out of exceptions; and so forth.25 Yet even where it
does so, the Court does not make or develop the law single-handedly; it operates
within thebroader contextof legal development and inmany respects is constrained
17 GA Res. 171 (II) of 1947. See also GA Res. 3232 (XXIX) of 1974.
18 NuclearWeapons, supra note 7, at 237, para. 18.
19 Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turkey) (Jurisdiction), [1978] ICJ Rep. 3, at 16–17, para. 39, with respect
to the Court’s potential pronouncement as to the status of a multilateral treaty.
20 See, e.g., the dissenting opinion of Judge A´lvarez in Competence of the General Assembly (Advisory Opinion),
[1950] ICJRep. 4, at 13. See generally on Judge A´lvarez’s positionon the lawmakingpowerof the International
Court K. Zobel, ‘Judge Alejandro A´lvarez at the International Court of Justice (1946–1955): His Theory of a
“New International Law” and Judicial Lawmaking’, (2006) 19 LJIL 1017–40.
21 See notablyWeeramantry, supra note 7, at 321; and Lauterpacht, supra note 5, passim.
22 Weeramantry, supra note 7, at 311.
23 Boyle and Chinkin, supra note 12, at 268.
24 R. Jennings andA.Watts (eds.),Oppenheim’s International Law, vol. 1 (1992), 41; Boyle andChinkin, supranote
12, at 268.
25 For details on the techniques used by international courts to inﬂuence the law see Lauterpacht, supra note 5,
at 156–7;Ch. deVisscher,TheoryandReality inPublic International Law, trans. P. E.Corbett (1968), 393–403; and,
in more detail, Weeramantry, supra note 7, at 313–20. According to the latter (at 320) the compounding of
decisions applying general rules to speciﬁc facts unavoidably leads to further elaboration and development
of the law, even if only on a ‘micro scale’. Cf. H. Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre (1960), 242 ff., who speaks of the
‘constitutive character of judicial decisions’ in general.
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by it. Two obvious ‘obstacles to the rapid judicial development of the law’26 (which
talk about ‘judge-made law’ risks overlooking) are of particular importance. First,
as is the case with all courts, the ICJ’s role is reactive; it depends on cases instituted
before it. Unlike domestic courts, however, international jurisdiction is consensual
rather than compulsory. Since 1946, the Court has been seized of a timid average
of 2.3 ICJ cases per year.27 And while there are patterns of repeated involvement
(notably maritime delimitation and, perhaps, the use of force), this has prevented
the Court from developing the law in any systematic or comprehensive way.
Second, and more importantly, the Court’s inﬂuence on the process of legal
development is interstitial. It no doubt has a chance to inﬂuence the law through
its decisions, but its inﬂuence is limited in time.28 Once it has rendered its decisions,
the case – and with it the legal issues that it had raised – is out of the Court’s hands.
Nothing prevents other actors from ignoring, overruling, or limiting the impact of
the Court’s contribution.29 ICJ decisions are not per se relevant contributions to the
process of legal development, but only to the extent that they are acceptable to the
international legal community. Outside the bounds ofArticle 59 of the Statute, their
authority is persuasive only. And so theymust ‘persuade’.
1.2. ‘Rules of thumb’ on the ICJ’s contribution to legal development
In the light of these considerations, it may be preferable to avoid terms such as
‘judicial lawmaking’ and instead speak of the Court’s role as an ‘agent’30 or actor
participating in theprocessof legal development.Whenseeking toassess theagent’s
inﬂuenceon theprocess, legal arguments about thenormative valueof ICJ decisions
provide only the starting point for the enquiry. The real question, instead, is to assess
towhat extent a particular ICJ decision has in fact shaped the law in a given area. As
far as speciﬁc holdings are concerned, this can of course be done retrospectively – by
evaluatingtheimpactofagivenICJpronouncementonthesubsequentdevelopment
of the law. By contrast, it ismuchmore difﬁcult to assess in the abstract underwhich
conditions ICJ pronouncements are likely to be inﬂuential. Despite the wealth of
debate about the conceptual problems of ‘judge-made law’, this question is hardly
26 De Visscher, supra note 25, at 391. For considerations on the ‘limits of lawmaking’ see also D. Terris, C.
Romano, and L. Swigart, The International Judge: An Introduction to the Men andWomenWho Decide theWorld’s
Cases (2007), 127–30.
27 This is the most generous calculation, based on the number of cases inscribed on the Court’s
General List (146 as at May 2010), including those quickly dropped. For full details see www.icj-
cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=2. It should be noted that even Charles de Visscher, who otherwise
stressed the importance of judicial law-making, remarked that ‘[d]oubtless long years must still pass and
many more judgments be rendered before the Court’s decisions can be synthesized in a systematic body of
principles or rules’ (supra note 25, at 403). See further Boyle and Chinkin, supra note 12, at 269.
28 In Pellet’s terms, ‘the Court does not have the last word’ (supra note 5, at 790 (mn. 319)).
29 Thereversal, inArt. 1of the1952BrusselsCollisionConventionandArt. 11of the1958HighSeasConvention,
of the Lotus ruling on the exercise of national criminal jurisdiction over persons responsible for collisions
on the high seas may be themost prominent example in point. For brief comment see A. von Bogdandy and
M. Rau, ‘Lotus, The’, inWolfrum, supra note 2, at para. 20.
30 Cf. Lauterpacht, supra note 5, at 5: international tribunals as ‘agencies for the development of international
law’.
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addressedinanydetail. Ifanything,commentatorshavetypicallyadvancedanumber
of rather simple ‘rules of thumb’.31
Two of these ‘rules of thumb’ seem to have gained particular currency.32 One
refers to the reasoning supporting a particular pronouncement. Schwarzenberger,
commenting on the likely impact of judicial decisions on the formation of inter-
national law, noted that much depended on ‘the fullness and cogency of the reas-
oning’ and that it ‘was not accidental that the least convincing statements on
international law made by the International Court of Justice excel by a remark-
able economy of argument’.33 Others rely on the common-law distinction between
ratio and obiter,34 with Amerasinghe suggesting that ‘[m]ore authority naturally at-
taches to the former than to the latter.’35 Lastly, it is argued that the concerns raised
by activist lawmaking had affected the attitude of the Court and its members. A
recent study qualiﬁes them as ‘reluctant lawmakers’, fully aware that they ought
not to be perceived to make law.36 In a similar vein, Judge Shahabuddeen (writing
extrajudicially) concludes his detailed analysis by observing that the ICJ typically
navigated ‘from case to case, like the ancient Mediterranean mariners, hugging the
coast from point to point and avoiding the dangers of the open sea of system and
science’.37
The picture emerging from these brief considerations is that while questions of
judicial lawmakingmayhave been rather overworked conceptually,we are still a far
cry from assessing with any certainty the circumstances under which a particular
judicial pronouncement is likely to shape the law. The subsequent discussion will
not solve this problem. Yet it will approach it inductively, by assessing the impact
of the two key holdings of the Barcelona Traction case and by drawing a number of
tentative lessons from that decision’s history.
2. THE LASTING IMPACT OF THE BARCELONA TRACTION
PRONOUNCEMENTS
Given the conceptual problemsof judicial lawmaking, and themixed reaction to the
Court’s decision, it seemed by no means clear that Barcelona Traction should shape
international law. Yet, for better or worse, the judgment’s central holdings remain
extremely inﬂuential.
31 But see the balanced considerations in Boyle and Chinkin, supra note 12, at 300–10.
32 In addition to the ‘rules of thumb’ addressed in the text, it isworthmentioning that some commentators (e.g.
G. Schwarzenberger, International Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals, vol. 1 (1957), 31) place
emphasis on themargin by which a decision has been reached: hence a pronouncement that has gained the
unanimous or near-unanimous support of the bench is said to bemore inﬂuential than one that divided the
Court.
33 Schwarzenberger, supra note 32, at 32. For similar points see, e.g., Terris et al., supra note 26, at 121; and Boyle
and Chinkin, supra note 12, at 302.
34 See, e.g., R. Y. Jennings, ‘The Judiciary, National and International, and the Development of International
Law’, (1996) 45 ICLQ 1, at 6 ff.; M. Shahabuddeen, Precedent in the World Court (1996), 152–64; L. Condorelli,
‘L’autorite´ de la de´cision des juridictions internationales permanentes’, in La juridiction internationale perman-
ente. Colloque de Lyon (1987), 277, at 308.
35 C. F. Amerasinghe, State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens (1967), 33.
36 Terris et al., supra note 26, at 129. A similar point had already beenmade by Lauterpacht, supra note 5, at 77.
37 Shahabuddeen, supra note 34, at 233 (citing Lord Devlin, ‘The Study of the Law’, (1938) 54 LQR 186).
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2.1. Diplomatic claims on behalf of corporations
1. As for diplomatic protection, it is submitted that the Court’s approach to nation-
ality continues to govern the law of diplomatic claims. To recall, the Court rejected
Belgium’s claim to exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of a company that was
registered in Canada but was effectively controlled by Belgian shareholders. Its
reasoning on this point was based on three key considerations.
(i) The Court emphasized the distinction between shareholders and company,
which were ‘separated . . . by numerous barriers’, including the ‘separation of prop-
erty rights’.38 This approach was indeed accepted in many domestic legal systems,
but rather than saying that domestic law was merely a fact (as the Permanent
Court of International Justice (PCIJ) had done39), the Court, accepting a renvoi, held
that international law would be ‘called upon to recognize’ the domestic distinction
between corporation and shareholder, as ‘international law had not established its
own rules’.40
(ii) Controlled by municipal law, international law had to respect the sharp dis-
tinctionbetweenshareholdersandcompany.Theobviouswaytoimplementthiswas
to make nationality dependent on the formal criterion of incorporation, provided
at least that there was some real connection going beyondmere registration41 – one
might call this the ‘incorporation plus X’ approach.
(iii) In contrast, the Court was adamant that shareholder rights could not be
equated with rights of the company. While some states had previously acted on
behalf of a company controlled by shareholders bearing their nationality, the Court
(without really assessing it) considered this practice to be insufﬁcient.42 In its view,
the shareholders’ state could therefore exercise diplomatic protection for the com-
pany only exceptionally:43 (a) if special treaty rules so provided; (b) in special cases
concerning the treatment of enemy property and nationalizations; (c) if the com-
pany had ceased to exist; and (d) perhaps if claims were raised against the state of
incorporation (‘protection by substitution’). But no special treaty applied, nor did
any of the exceptions. What is more, the Court saw no need to assess in any detail
whether Spain had violated direct rights of the shareholders (which Belgium could,
of course, have espoused by way of diplomatic protection).44
2. The Court’s holding on nationality disappointed many commentators.45 With
respect to the Court’s reasoning, criticism indeed seemed justiﬁed. In particular, the
Court’s ‘domestic analogy’ rested on rather shaky foundations,46 and one couldhave
38 Barcelona Traction, supra note 1, at 34, para. 41.
39 See Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia [1926] PCIJ Ser A No 7 at 19: ‘from the standpoint of
International Law . . . municipal laws are merely facts . . . which constitute the activities of States, in the
samemanner as do legal decisions or administrative measures’.
40 Barcelona Traction, supra note 1, at 33–4, para. 38.
41 Ibid., at 42, para. 71.
42 Ibid., at 40 and 46–47, paras. 62 and 89, for the Court’s very brief remarks.
43 Ibid., especially at 39 ff. and 41 ff., paras. 59 ff. and 69 ff.
44 Ibid., at 37, para. 49.
45 For a near-exhaustive discussion of the academic debate see S. Beyer,Der diplomatische Schutz der Aktiona¨re im
Vo¨lkerrecht (1977), 48 ff.
46 A point stressed by Ch. de Visscher, ‘La notion de re´fe´rence (renvoi) au droit interne dans la protection
diplomatiquedes actionnaires’, (1971) 7Revue belge de droit international1; andL.C.Caﬂisch, ‘TheProtectionof
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expected a more detailed analysis of actual instances of diplomatic protection on
behalf of shareholders.47 As for the outcome, there was widespread concern that by
stressing the separation between company and shareholders, theCourt had adopted
a formal or ‘rigid’ approach, ignored the realities of international business, and
divorced law from real life.48
Looked at from a distance, this last criticism seems exaggerated. As the brief
summary shows, the Court’s approach was by nomeans as ‘formal’ as is sometimes
suggested. The Barcelona Traction companywas not an ‘empty shell’, and the Court
emphasized its ‘manifold links’ with Canada.49 One might even say that while the
Court refused to make the nationality of corporations dependent on a genuine
link requirement (as developed in its Nottebohm judgment50), its ‘incorporation
plus X’ test came rather close to it: in both instances, international legal rules on
nationality rely on domestic legal acts but complement this formal approach by
adding a substantive criterion to prevent abuse. Perhaps more importantly, the
Court’s allegedly formalistic approach to nationality had obvious advantages. It
relied on a rather simple test and –unlike competing approaches emphasizingmore
tangible ties such as control of business or the ‘social seat’ of a company – produced
clear and predictable results. It thus avoided problems of multiple claims brought
by different states, which, as the Court stated, would have created ‘an atmosphere of
confusion and insecurity in international economic relations’.51 And it was ﬂexible
in that the Court admitted the possibility of special rules deviating from the general
approach.
3. These factorsmay help to explain the continuing relevance of the Court’s holding
on nationality. To be sure, in many respects international law has moved on. Since
1970, states have agreed on awide range of treaty rules laying down special require-
ments for claims relating to the treatment of foreign corporations. Very often, these
do not follow the Court’s Barcelona Traction approach of requiring ‘incorporation
plus X’. Some deﬁne nationality on the basis of some form of control;52 others are
more formal than the ICJ had been, in that they consider incorporation as such to
Corporate InvestmentsAbroad in theLightof theBarcelonaTractionCase’, (1971)31Zeitschrift fu¨r ausla¨ndisches
o¨ffentliches Recht und Vo¨lkerrecht 162, at 172.
47 See, e.g., R. B. Lillich, ‘The Rigidity of Barcelona’, (1971) 65AJIL 522, esp. at 525; R. Higgins, ‘Aspects of the Case
Concerning the Barcelona Traction Light and Power Company, Ltd.’, (1971) 11Virginia Journal of International
Law 327, at 331.
48 See notably F. A. Mann, ‘The Protection of Shareholders’ Interests in the Light of the Barcelona TractionCase’,
(1973) 67 AJIL 259.
49 Wittich, supra note 2, at para. 19. See also para. 3 of the ILC’s commentary to Art. 9 of its Draft Articles
on Diplomatic Protection adopted in 2006 (in UN Doc. A/61/10), where it is observed that ‘[t]he Court in
Barcelona Traction was not, however, satisﬁed with incorporation as the sole criterion for the exercise of
diplomatic protection.’
50 SeeNottebohm (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala) (Second Phase), [1955] ICJ Rep. 4, at 23.
51 Barcelona Traction, supra note 1, at 37, para. 49.
52 In this respect see, e.g., the Claims Settlement Declaration establishing the Iran–US Claims Tribunal, (1981)
20 ILM 230, Art. VII(1), pursuant to which claims of legal persons are permitted only ‘if collectively, natural
personswho are citizens of such country [i.e. Iran or theUnited States] hold, directly or indirectly, an interest
in such corporation or entity equivalent to ﬁfty per cent or more of its capital stock’.
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be sufﬁcient.53 Perhaps more importantly, a huge number of bilateral investment
treaties (BITs) establish special mechanisms for investment protection and blur the
line between shareholders and company which the Court had emphasized.54 More
often than not, these BITs expressly state that shareholdings should be treated as
investments for the purposes of mixed arbitration – and, surprisingly, these juris-
dictional provisions have been used to assimilate substantive shareholder rights
with rights of the company.55 Finally, investment treaties now frequently permit
claims in defence of indirect investments, which allows claimants to circumvent
the strictures of nationality rules. In short, it can hardly be questioned that many
disputes that would have given rise to diplomatic claims on behalf of corporations
at the timeofBarcelonaTraction are today addressedwithin special legal frameworks,
notablybywayof investment arbitration. In its recentDiallo judgment, the ICJnoted
that ‘in contemporary international law, the protection of the rights of companies
and the rights of shareholders is essentially governed by bilateral or multilateral
agreements for the protection of foreign investments’.56 Yet, as that case shows,
diplomatic claims on behalf of corporations remain a possibility.
Where such claims are brought by means of diplomatic protection, the more
convincing approach is, indeed, that the ‘incorporation plus X’ test laid down in
Barcelona Traction continues to govern. There have, of course, been attempts to
discard it altogether. According to Orrego Vicun˜a, for example, ‘the aggregate of
the practice [as summarized in the last section] demonstrates forcefully that the
criteria of the Barcelona Traction case no longer prevail and that shareholders should
be entitled to protection’.57 Yet that view is attractive only at ﬁrst sight. It ignores
the distinction between the general rule and special provisions: if the latter were
concluded to disapply the former, then they implicitly afﬁrm the general rule, even
if simply as the default rule. The whole point of the maxim lex specialis derogat legi
generali is to maintain the relevance of the general rule, giving occasional priority to
any potential special rule providing differently.58 With respect to using investment
treaties as evidence there is a further problem, not always acknowledged by those
criticizing Barcelona Traction. As observed by Kate Parlett, investment arbitration is
not ‘a morphed form of delegated diplomatic protection’;59 rather, Article 27 of the
53 See the practice discussed in L. J. Lee, ‘ Barcelona Traction in the 21st Century: Revisiting Its Customary
and Policy Underpinnings 35 Years Later’, (2006) 42 Stanford Journal of International Law 237, at 252–3 and
Appendix 1.
54 For comment on this point see notably I. A. Laird, ‘A Community of Destiny: The Barcelona TractionCase and
theDevelopmentofShareholderRights toBring InvestmentClaims’, inT.Weiler (ed.), International Investment
Law and Arbitration: Leading Cases from the ICSID, NAFTA, Bilateral Treaties and Customary International Law
(2005), 77; C. Schreuer, ‘Shareholder Protection in International Investment Law’, in P.-M. Dupuy et al. (eds.),
Vo¨lkerrecht als Wertordnung – Common Values in International Law: Festschrift fu¨r Christian Tomuschat (2006),
601; M. Paparinskis, ‘Barcelona Traction: A Friend of Investment Protection Law’, (2008) 8 Baltic Yearbook of
International Law 105.
55 For pertinent criticism see Z. Douglas, The International Law of Investment Claims (2009), 398 ff.
56 Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. DRC) (Preliminary Objections), [2007] ICJ Rep., at para. 88.
57 F.OrregoVicun˜a, InternationalDisputeSettlement inanEvolvingGlobal Society–Constitutionalization,Accessibility,
Privatization (2004), 42.
58 See, e.g., para. 3 of the ILC’s commentary to Art. 55 ASR (in UNDoc. A/56/10).
59 K. Parlett, ‘Role of Diplomatic Protection in the Protection of Foreign Investments’, (2007) 66Cambridge Law
Journal 533, at 535. For more on this point see S. J. Knight and A. J. O’Brien, ‘Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic
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Conventionon theSettlement of InvestmentDisputes betweenStates andNationals
of Other States (ICSID Convention) suggests that it is an alternative to diplomatic
protection rather than a redeﬁnition of its conditions.
Given these conceptual problems, reports about the death, or ‘bypassing’,60 of
Barcelona Traction seem greatly exaggerated. The allegedly technical holding
remains, rather, in good shape. In fact, whenever the international community,
since 1970, has had to address general rules on diplomatic protection of corpora-
tions, it has relied on the much-criticized Barcelona Traction holding. In the ELSI
case, a chamber of the Court afﬁrmed the central message of Barcelona Traction,
even though it accepted, exceptionally, a claim of ‘protection by substitution’ on the
basis of a special bilateral treaty regime.61 In his report on diplomatic protection
of corporations, the ILC’s Special Rapporteur John Dugard observed that Barcelona
Traction ‘dominate[d] all discussion of this topic’.62 On the basis of his work the ILC
discussed at length whether to replace the ‘incorporation plus X’ test by any of the
competing theories (sie`ge social, centre of business, and so forth), but decided against
it. In essence, draft articles 9–12 afﬁrm the central features of the Court’s Barcelona
Traction ruling – hence the ILC echoes the warning against multiple actions,63 and
afﬁrms that ‘[t]he most fundamental principle of the diplomatic protection of cor-
porations is that a corporation is to be protected by the state of nationality of the
corporation and not by the state or states of nationality of the shareholders’.64 While
the 2006 Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection attempt to specify the required
tangible ties between a company and its state of incorporation,65 the ILC’s work on
balance probably is best seen as an attempt – perhaps akin to that of a glossator
explaining the meaning of a provision of Justinian’s codex – to concretize the mes-
sage of Barcelona Traction, not to move away from it. And to the extent that the ILC
might have been perceived as moving away, the ICJ’s recent judgment in the Diallo
case clearly reafﬁrms Barcelona Traction’s key holdings:66 while recognizing the in-
creasing importance of special legal frameworks, the Court continues to emphasize
the distinction between a company and its shareholders, stresses the importance of
incorporation to determine the nationality of the former, and seems to take a more
of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo): Clarifying the Scope of Diplomatic Protection of Corporate
and Shareholder Rights’, (2008) 9Melbourne Journal of International Law 151, at s.IV.D.; and cf. M Paparinskis,
‘InvestmentArbitration and the LawofCountermeasures’, (2008) 79British Year Book of International Law 264,
at 281–97.
60 Orrego Vicun˜a, supra note 57, at 40.
61 Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI), [1989] ICJ Rep. 15, especially at 79–80, para. 132. For comment see A. V. Lowe,
‘Shareholders’ Rights to Control and Manage: From Barcelona Traction to ELSI’, in N. Ando et al. (eds.), Liber
amicorum Judge Shigeru Oda, vol. 1 (2002), 269; F. A. Mann, ‘Foreign Investment in the International Court
of Justice: The ELSI Case’, (1992) 86 AJIL 92. In the Diallo case (on which more below), the Court itself has
stated that the ELSI ruling should be read as a special rule based on the applicable friendship, commerce,
and navigation (FCN) treaty.
62 Fourth Report on Diplomatic Protection, UNDoc. A/CN.4/530, at para. 3.
63 Para. 6 of the commentary to draft art. 9 (in UNDoc. A/61/10).
64 Para. 1 of the commentary to draft art. 11 (in UNDoc. A/61/10) (emphasis in original).
65 Seenotably draft art. 9,whichprovides that if ‘a companyhadno substantial business activities in the State of
incorporation, and if the seat of management and the ﬁnancial control of a State are both located in another
State’, that other state should be entitled to exercise diplomatic protection.
66 Diallo, supra note 56, at paras. 60–67, particularly 61 and 64. Signiﬁcantly, both parties relied heavily on
Barcelona Traction in their arguments: see the Court’s summary in paras. 51 ff. of the judgment.
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cautious approach than the ILC (or indeed the Court itself, in ELSI) to the problem
of ‘protection by substitution’.67
To sum up, since 1970, special rules on nationality and special legal frameworks
for the vindication of investor rights havemultiplied. Yetwhile the exceptions have
becomemorenumerous, theyremainwhat theywere in1970:exceptionstoageneral
rule based on the ‘incorporation plus X’ test. Despite the amount of criticism, that
general rule remains largely unchanged. And so the law of diplomatic protection
remains premised on the Barcelona Traction approach – developments since 1970
may bemore than a footnote, but little more than a coda, to it.
2.2. Obligations erga omnes
1. TheCourt’s second important holding – on obligations erga omnes –has prompted
debates of a different character. On the face of it, it has been less controversial.
Only few commentators have openly criticized it, whilemany hail it as an inspiring
dictum. The question is not whether the Court was right to ‘invent’ the notion of
obligations erga omnes as an enforcement concept. Instead, debate centres on two
other issues: what did the Court mean by it? and does it matter?
The Court itself is responsible for much of the confusion surrounding the erga
omnes concept, as it introduced it in a rather mysterious way. The relevant passage
appears, without much advance warning, in paragraphs 33–34 of the Barcelona
Traction case, which state that
an essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State towards
the international community as a whole, and those arising vis-a`-vis another State in
the ﬁeld of diplomatic protection. By their very nature, the former are the concern
of all States. In view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held
to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes . . . Such
obligationsderive, forexample, incontemporary international law, fromtheoutlawing
of acts of aggression, and of genocide, as also from the principles and rules concerning
the basic rights of the human person, including protection from slavery and racial
discrimination.68
Thispronouncement continues to fascinate andpuzzle commentators (including
at times the Court and itsmembers).69 It is phrased in a rather complicatedway, not
least because it relies on a curious Latin concept (obligations erga omnes) that had
been used previously to describe third-party effects of treaties or judgments,70 but
67 Ibid., at paras. 86 ff. (discussing draft art. 11(b) of the ILC’sworkondiplomatic protection). For brief comment
see Knight and O’Brien, supra note 59, at s.IV.D.
68 Barcelona Traction, supra note 1, at 32, paras. 33–34.
69 A detailed treatment can be found, for example, in the following works: A. de Hoogh, Obligations Erga
Omnes and International Crimes (1996); C. J. Tams, Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law
(2005, 2010); S. Villalpando, L’e´mergence de la communaute´ internationale dans la responsabilite´ des Etats (2005);
L.-A. Sicilianos, Les re´actions de´centralise´es a´ l’illicite´ : des contre-mesures a´ la le´gitime de´fense (1990); P. Picone,
Comunita` internazionale e obblighi ‘erga omnes’ (2006); as well as in the contributions to C. Tomuschat and
J.-M. Thouvenin (eds.), The Fundamental Rules of the International Legal Order – Jus Cogens and Obligations Erga
Omnes (2006). The clearest summary is J. A. Frowein, ‘Obligations Erga Omnes’, in Wolfrum, supra note 2.
Ragazzi’s monograph, supra note 3, contains much information on speciﬁc examples of obligations erga
omnes, but curiously neglects the concept’s enforcement aspect.
70 See, e.g., A. D. McNair, ‘Treaties producing effects “erga omnes”’, in Scritti di diritto internazionale in Onore di
Tomaso Perassi, vol. 2 (1957), 21; and see Tams, supra note 69, at 103–6, for comment and further references.
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was now applied to the ﬁeld of law enforcement. Yet, on consideration, matters are
not that complicated. The essence of the erga omnes concept can be described in four
simple steps.
(i) International law draws a distinction between the general rules governing the
treatment of aliens, and a special set of rules protecting fundamental values.
(ii) To this special set of rules protecting fundamental values applies a special
regimeof standing.The right to raise claims in response toviolations isnot restricted
to the state of nationality (as it is under diplomatic protection).
(iii) Instead, certain fundamental values, being the concern of the international
community as a whole, can be protected by each and every state.
(iv) Finally, these rights of protection do not have to be conferred expressly by
treaty, but can (also) exist without a special written ‘empowerment’ – and would
then ﬂow from general international law.
Looked at in this rather sober way, one might say that obligations erga omnes are
not thatmysteriousafter all. The ideabehind theconcept is certainlyknowntomany
domestic legal systems, which accept that ‘technical rules of locus standi’ may need
to be modiﬁed where important interests are at stake, so as to permit the effective
protection of community interests.71 That said, to have embraced the concept of
obligations erga omnes certainlywas a giant leap for the ICJ. After all, only four years
earlier, in 1966, the same Court had relied on ‘technical rules of locus standi’72 to
dismiss an extremely high-proﬁle ‘public interest claim’ brought by Ethiopia and
Liberia against South Africa.73 As is well known, SouthWest Africawas a disaster for
the Court – from a legal but also ‘from a public relations point of view’74 – and it
required the Court tomitigate damage, which it did in twoways: by recognizing the
UN’s termination of the South African mandate,75 and by launching the erga omnes
concept. In so doing, it accepted that for a narrowly deﬁned circle of community
obligations, international law should be prepared to accept law enforcement by
many states, even if thismight create ‘an atmosphere of confusion and insecurity in
international [economic] relations’.76
2. What, then, have been the effects of this ‘other’ Barcelona Traction dictum? In
practice, one popular answer is (or at least was) that they are next to nothing. Hugh
Thirlway, in his otherwise excellent review of ICJ jurisprudence in the British Year
Book, suggests that obligations erga omnes are a ‘purely theoretical category’ and the
passage ‘little more than an empty gesture’.77 Putting it rather more bluntly, Alfred
Rubin labelled obligations erga omnes the product of ‘the wishful thinking of some
71 See theHouse of Lords’ landmark decision in the ‘Fleet Street Casuals’ case:R. v. Inland Revenue Commissioners
ex parte Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses Ltd, [1982] AC 617, at 644.E (Lord Diplock).
72 Ibid.
73 SouthWest Africa (Liberia v. South Africa) (Ethiopia v. South Africa) (Second Phase) (Merits), [1966] ICJ Rep. 6.
74 J. Crawford, ‘Preface’, in Tams, supra note 69, at xiii. For a comprehensive assessment of the case and its
aftermath see J. Dugard, The South West Africa/Namibia Dispute – Documents and Scholarly Writings on the
Controversy between South Africa and the United Nations (1973).
75 LegalConsequences forStatesof theContinuedPresenceofSouthAfrica inNamibia (SouthWestAfrica)notwithstanding
Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) (Advisory Opinion), [1971] ICJ Rep. 16.
76 Barcelona Traction, supra note 1, at 49, para. 96.
77 H. Thirlway, ‘The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice 1960–1989’, (1989) 60 British Year
Book of International Law 1, at 100.
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publicistswhohavenomoney to spend,no troops to send,nochildren likely todie in
amilitaryaction’.78 Thesemayseemextremestatements, yet theydrawsupport from
the fact that, forty years after Barcelona Traction, the Court still has to hear its ﬁrst
full-blown ‘erga omnes case’. There have, of course, been instances of public interest
litigation before the Court, including the Nuclear Tests cases brought by Australia
andNewZealand,79 Portugal’sEastTimor case,80 or thependingproceedingsbetween
Belgium and Senegal;81 yet, typically, applicant states in these cases have sought to
emphasize their special interest in the subject matter before the Court.82
Still, the cautious reading of Thirlway, Rubin, and others seems to lose ground.
On consideration, the much more convincing view is that – despite the absence of
proper ICJ cases – the erga omnes concept has been a remarkable success. There are
twomain arguments to support this claim. First, the cautious readingmay be based
on an unrealistic view of the ICJ. While recent decades have witnessed an increase
in the number of cases, states very rarely institute ICJ proceedings; thus one should
not make toomuch of the absence of erga omnes cases.
Second, and more importantly, even without proper ICJ cases, the erga omnes
concept has left itsmark on international law. It has ‘developed apace’83 and ‘spilled
over’ into other areas of law, notably the law of state responsibility. The ILC’s 2001
Articles (notbinding in law,but formulated inclose co-operationwithgovernments)
in particular take up the idea of ‘law enforcement in the public interest’. Drawing
on Barcelona Traction, Article 48 of the ILC’s text recognizes the right of each state
to invoke another state’s responsibility if ‘the obligation breached is owed to the
international community as a whole’ (i.e. an obligation erga omnes).84 While Article
48 merely spells out the meaning of the Barcelona Traction dictum, that dictum has
also been applied to justify other forms of law enforcement. Much of the debate
has centred on the countermeasures – that is, coercive measures taken in response
to serious and well-attested violations of obligations erga omnes.85 Whether such
a right exists remains a matter for debate. The ILC seemed unable to expressly
recognize it, and in its Article 54 left the matter open.86 However, practice suggests
a more liberal approach. On frequent occasions, states have asserted a right to
suspend treaties, freeze foreignassets, or imposeembargoes in response to erga omnes
breaches, against other states such as Zimbabwe, Belarus, Yugoslavia, South Africa,
78 A. Rubin, ‘Comment’, in J. Delbru¨ck (ed.), The Future of International Law Enforcement: New Scenarios – New
Law? (1993), 171, at 172.
79 [1974] ICJ Rep. 253 and 457.
80 [1995] ICJ Rep. 90.
81 Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal) (Provisional Measures), Order of
28May 2009, available at www.icj-cij.org.
82 For details see Tams, supra note 69, 167 at fn. 42.
83 East Timor, supra note 80, at 215 (JudgeWeeramantry, Dissenting Opinion).
84 ASR, supra note 16, Art. 48.
85 Foradetailedanalysis seeM.Dawidowicz, ‘PublicLawEnforcementwithoutPublicLawSafeguards?Analysis
of State Practice onThird-Party Countermeasures and Their Relationship to theUNSecurity Council’, (2006)
77 British Year Book of International Law 333; and Tams, supra note 69, at 198–251.
86 For comment on the terminological problems raised by Art. 54 see L. A. Sicilianos, ‘The Classiﬁcation of
Obligations and the Multilateral Dimension of the Relations of International Responsibility’, (2002) 13 EJIL
1127, at 1139–44.
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and so forth.87 Given this rather widespread practice, much suggests that the ‘erga
omnes rationale’ has modiﬁed the rules governing countermeasures.88
Theremayalsobeotherspillovereffects,outside theﬁeldof responsibility.89 Some
argue that the erga omnes concept should govern questions of jurisdiction;90 others
proclaimergaomneseffectsonconceptssuchaswaiverorestoppel;91 andtheICJinthe
Wall opinion seemed to imply that states were under a duty not to recognize effects
of erga omnes breaches.92 Finally, treaties with express law enforcement clauses are
now called ‘erga omnes partes’ treaties, as if only the ‘erga omnes’ label could justify a
broad approach to standing.
Someof these ‘other’ alleged ergaomneseffectsmayadmittedlybequestionable.To
take but one example, the frequent references to obligations erga omnes partes seem
to ignore the fact that the erga omnes concept is intended to close an enforcement
gap, and thus is hardly necessary where a treaty expressly provides for standing in
the public interest. Yet the brief survey shows that the erga omnes concept, far from
beingapurely theoretical category, clearlyhasaplace incontemporary international
practice and jurisprudence. In fact, the real problem today seems to be one of over-
use: there is a tendency, among ‘publicists . . . without money to spend’,93 but also
amongmembers of the International Court, to use the erga omnes concept as a legal
vade mecum that can conveniently be used to explain all sorts of legal effects. In
the long run, this inﬂationary reliance may be the real challenge for the erga omnes
concept.94 Yet it clearly shows that the Court’s ‘PR exercise’ has successfully placed
a concept on the legal agenda, and that this concept has developed (if the termmay
be permitted in this context) a considerable amount of ‘traction’.
87 The various instances are assessed in the works mentioned supra, note 85.
88 Tams, supra note 69, at 249–51; J.A. Frowein, ‘Reactions by not Directly Affected States to Breaches of Public
International Law’, (1994) 248 RCADI 345, at 417 ff.
89 The most radical extension of the erga omnes concept can be found in Judge Canc¸ado Trindade’s separate
opinion appended to the Court’s interim order in the Belgium v. Senegal case (supra note 81, at paras. 68–73).
In the judge’s view, the erga omnes concept, ‘heralding the advent of the international legal order of our times,
committed to theprevalenceof superior commonvalues’ (para. 71), required awide-ranging reinterpretation
of traditional international law; notably it implied the granting of interim protection under more lenient
conditions, and the horizontal application of human rights law. For brief comment see Tams, supra note 69,
312 ff. (new epilogue to the paperback edition).
90 See, e.g., R. vanAlebeek, ‘The Pinochet Case: International Human Rights Law on Trial’, (2000) 71 British Year
Book of International Law 29, at 34.
91 See, e.g., Gabcikovo Nagymaros, [1997] ICJ Rep. 7, at 117–18 (Judge Weeramantry, Dissenting Opinion); R.
Lefeber, ‘Editorial: CumGrano Salis’, (1998) 11 LJIL 1, at 6–7; C. J. Tams, ‘Waiver, Acquiescence and Extinctive
Prescription’, in J. Crawford, A. Pellet, and S. Olleson (eds.), The Law of International Responsibility (2010), para.
14.
92 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion), [2004]
ICJ Rep. 136, at 200, para. 159. Thismay have been better explained as a consequence of the serious breach of
an obligation imposed by a peremptory norm in the sense of ASR, Art. 41. For comment see S. Talmon, ‘The
Duty Not to “Recognize as Lawful” a Situation Created by the Illegal Use of Force or Other Serious Breaches
of a Jus CogensObligation: AnObligationwithout Real Substance?’, in Tomuschat andThouvenin, supranote
69, at 99–125.
93 Rubin, supra note 78.
94 See Judge Higgins’s pertinent observation in her separate opinion in theWall opinion (supra note 90, at 216,
para. 37 (Judge Higgins, Separate Opinion): ‘The Court’s celebrated dictum in Barcelona Traction, Light and
Power Company, Limited, Second Phase (Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1970, p. 32, para. 33) is frequently invoked for
more than it can bear.’
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3. THE LESSONS OF BARCELONA TRACTION
The preceding assessment suggests that while – as a dispute settlement body –
the Court in Barcelona Traction performed rather disappointingly, the judgment’s
pronouncements have exercised considerable inﬂuence on the development of
international law in two important areas. The question remains whether Barcelona
Traction yields lessons of amore general nature about theCourt’s potential role as an
agent of legal development.When addressing that question in the following, we are
mindful of the fact thatBarcelona Traction is just one case, and thatwehave looked at
only two particular processes of legal development. Still, we would submit that the
experience of the Court’s two pronouncements invites a number of observations.
Given the uncertainties surrounding the ICJ’s role as an agent of legal development,
these may be usefully spelled out even where they seem to appear straightforward
or obvious. More speciﬁcally, we would submit that Barcelona Traction yields ﬁve
lessons.
3.1. Courts can be both reluctant and enthusiastic lawmakers
The ﬁrst lesson relates to the attitude of the Court when engaging in legal develop-
ment. Barcelona Traction provides evidence of two different attitudes: in line with
what is perceived to be its general approach, the Court was a ‘reluctant’95 agent of
legal development, but it also – contrary to the common perception – interpreted
its role muchmore enthusiastically.
With respect to thequestionof diplomatic claims, theCourt, inBarcelonaTraction,
could hardly avoid shaping the law. No generally agreed test governing the nation-
ality of corporations had been accepted, nor had the matter been addressed by any
major treaty;96 so the Court’s pronouncement was very likely to be applied outside
the speciﬁc case before it. That the Court was reluctant and circumscribed in its
approach to the question it had to answer is evident, hence its choice of a simple and
straightforward general rule not requiringmuch in theway of proof (incorporation)
over other possibilities (sie`ge social, the strongest link) which would have been less
predictable.
By contrast, in its pronouncement on erga omnes obligations the Court was not
reluctant or circumscribed at all. Taking up LordDevlin’s above-quoted remark, one
might say that, rather than ‘hugging the coast point by point’, the Court boldly set
sail for ‘the open sea’.97 What is more, it did so of its own accord, as no gap was
waiting to be ﬁlled, no outstanding issue had to be decided lest there be a non liquet.
The Court could perfectly well have spared the world paragraphs 33 and 34, and
no one would have realized – because no one expected them to be there in the ﬁrst
place. In fact, it may well be that, precisely because no speciﬁc outcome was at
stake, the Court considered itself free to engage in its exercise of ‘enthusiastic’ legal
development. The experience of Barcelona Traction certainly suggests thatwhere the
95 Terris et al., supra note 26, 129.
96 The Court determined the existence of a gap quite clearly when it stated that ‘international law had not
established its own rules’ on the matter under consideration: see supra note 40.
97 Supra note 37.
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Court – exceptionally, no doubt – decides to ‘leave the coast’,98 it may also leave
behind it its usual concerns for straightforward rules ensuring legal certainty. Yet,
more fundamentally,BarcelonaTraction clearly shows that commonassertions about
the cautious nature of the Court need to be taken with a grain of salt. It is by no
means always a ‘reluctant lawmaker’,99 but, at least occasionally, goes out of its way
enthusiastically to ‘strik[e] out a path towards new developments in the law’.100
3.2. Popular rules of thumb are of limited usefulness
The second observation relates to the ‘rules of thumb’ put forward by commen-
tators to assess the likely impact of judicial pronouncements on the development
of international law. As noted above, two such rules of thumb are popular among
writers: the preference for ratio over obiter, and the preference for well-reasoned
judicial pronouncements.101 Curiously, neither of them is borne out by theBarcelona
Traction case.102
3.2.1. Poorly reasoned statements can inﬂuence the law
Intuitively, few would disagree with the latter ‘rule’ given here, yet the Barcelona
Traction case provides little support for it. As noted above, the Court’s reasoning in
the case is by no means above criticism.With respect to obligations erga omnes, the
Court did not in fact offer any justiﬁcation. It asserted a certain legal proposition,
without even the slightest hint whence it had been ‘deduced’. With respect to
the rule of nationality of corporations, the Court did offer some justiﬁcation for
its ‘incorporation plus X’ test, but its reasoning was at best brief and debatable.
Yet poorly – if at all – reasoned as they may have been, both pronouncements have
shaped the law.This shouldnotbe takenasanargumentagainst reasoning in judicial
decisions. Of course well-reasoned judgments are a ‘better’ form of administering
justice than poorly reasoned ones. Yet the experience of Barcelona Traction suggests
that one should not place toomuch emphasis on the (intuitively persuasive) rule of
thumbput forwardbycommentators: the likely impactof a judicial pronouncement
need not always depend on the ‘fullness or cogency of quality of the reasoning’.103
Conversely, evenwhere theCourt pronouncements ‘excel by a remarkable economy
of argument’,104 they may very well shape the law.
3.2.2. The law can be shaped by obiter dicta
The second rule of thumb fares little better. In fact, the considerable impact of the
Court’spronouncementonobligations ergaomnes suggests that thecommondistinc-
tion between ratio decidendi and obiter dicta is of limited relevance in international
98 Ibid.
99 Terris et al., supra note 26, 129.
100 De Visscher, supra note 25, 397.
101 Supra, section 1.2.
102 In contrast, the experience of the case conﬁrms the third ‘rule of thumb’ – namely that unanimous or near-
unanimous pronouncements by the Court would be more likely to inﬂuence the law. See supra note 32 for
reference.
103 Schwarzenberger, supra note 33.
104 Ibid.
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law. This is so because the erga omnes pronouncement was not even remotely relev-
ant to the case before the Court; it was – to cite Lord Abinger’s remark – ‘not only an
obiter dictum, but a very wide divaricating dictum’.105 And yet it is one of the Court’s
most quoted pronouncements of all time. So at least in one instance, ‘a gratuitous
statement’106 expressed in an ‘obiter reasoning’107 did shape the law.
Of course, one could dismiss this particular observation if it were merely an
exception that proved the rule.108 But it is not. In a surprisingly large number of
instances, international law has been shaped by obiter dicta – typically not as ‘obiter’
as the erga omnes dictum, but still irrelevant to the case at hand. By way of example,
sufﬁce it to mention the PCIJ’s obiter dicta asserting the primacy of restitution over
compensation (Chorzo´w Factory),109 and the possibility of creating rights of third
partieswithout their consent (Free Zones).110 In fact, even one of themost prominent
(if controversial) judicial statements of all time, the PCIJ’s Lotus presumption – that
‘[r]estrictions upon the independence of States cannot . . . be presumed’ – was pure
obiter.111
Adetailed studyon ‘obiter that shaped the law’hasyet tobewritten.112 Thepresent
cursory remarks are no substitute for it. What they indicate is that the distinction
between ratio and obiter, essential in legal systems relying on doctrines of precedent,
shouldnotbelightlytransposedtotheinternationalsphere. Internationallawknows
of no system of precedent. What is more, the experience of Barcelona Traction –
but also of Free Zones, Chorzo´w Factory, and Lotus – suggests that the seemingly
categorical distinction between ratio and obiter is of little relevance when assessing
the impact of a given judicial pronouncement.
3.3. Residual rules aremore likely tomake a lasting impact
In addition to questioning popular rules of thumb, Barcelona Traction offers some
insights into when a judgment is likely to make an impact. In this vein, the third
lesson to be drawn from a rereading of the case is that the Court’s pronouncements
are more likely to inﬂuence the development of the law if they posit a general,
105 Sunbolf v. Alford, (1838) 3 M. andW. 218, at 252.
106 S.McCaffrey, ‘Lex Lata or theContinuumof State Responsibility’, in J. H.H.Weiler, A. Cassese, andM. Spinedi
(eds.), International Crimes of States: A Critical Analysis of the ILC’s Draft Article 19 of State Responsibility (1989),
242, at 243.
107 For further attempts to dismiss the erga omnes dictum as irrelevant because of its obiter status see F. A. Mann,
‘The Doctrine of Jus Cogens in International Law’, in Ehmke et al. (eds.), Festschrift Scheuner (1973), 399, at
418 (a dictum ‘that was unnecessary to the decision and which convey[s] the impression of having been
studiously planted into the text or artiﬁcially dragged into the arena’); and similarly J. Charney, ‘Comment’,
in Delbru¨ck, supra note 78, 158 at 159.
108 It seems to be treated as such by many commentators who are prepared to accept the relevance of the erga
omnes dictum, butmaintain the distinction between ratio and obiter; see, e.g., Shahabuddeen, supranote 34, at
159; O. Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice (1991), 344 (‘Although this comment . . . was pure
obiter dictum, it has been widely inﬂuential’).
109 [1928] PCIJ, Ser.A,No. 17, at 47. In the circumstances of the case,Germanyhadonlydemanded compensation;
see C. Gray, Remedies in International Law (1987), 96.
110 [1932] PCIJ, Ser. A/B, No. 46, at 147. This was to serve as the basis for VCLT, Art. 36; see the ILC’s commentary
on draft article 32, (1966) 2 Yearbook of the International Law Commission 228, para. 4.
111 [1927] PCIJ, Ser. A, No. 10, at 18. In fact, the Lotus presumption is often criticized as (among other things)
having been unnecessary; see notably Lauterpacht, supra note 5, at 361.
112 For a slightly fuller treatment see Tams, supra note 69, at 167–73.
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residual rule that admits of exceptions. This is brought out very clearly by the
remarkable ‘success’ of the Court’s holding on nationality.
In the circumstances of the case, any attempt by the Court to formulate a general
test governing the nationality of corporations – whether relying on incorporation,
seat, strongest link, or any other potential criterion – would have acquired general
relevance. The case squarely raised an issue of major practical and theoretical rel-
evance and required the Court to address it on the basis of general international
law.While the Court thus could hardly avoidmaking a pronouncement that would
acquire general relevance, it ‘secured’ its approach by admitting the possibility of
exceptions. It effectively articulated a general, default rule that allowed for further
development through the carving out of exceptions, the reﬁnement of the scope of
application of the general rule, and so forth. In this respect, the Barcelona Traction
case afﬁrms Lauterpacht’s observation (preceding the judgment) that
[judicial legislation] cannot attempt to lay down all the details of the application of the
principle onwhich it is based. It lays down the broadprinciple and applies it to the case
before it. Its elaboration must be left . . . to ordinary legislative processes or to future
judicial decisions disposing of problems as they arise.113
Indeed, since 1970 both ‘ordinary legislative processes’ and ‘future judicial de-
cisions’ have built on the Court’s general rule of nationality in Barcelona Traction.
What ismore, states have progressively elaborated on the principle, even if that has
beenprimarily through themakingof special rules,with the concomitant reduction
in the practical signiﬁcance of the general rule. Still, as further demonstrated by the
Court in its recentDiallo judgment, the Barcelona Traction general rule of nationality
of corporations has retained its status as the fallback position.114
In fact, experience since 1970 suggests that while the broad and residual rule on
nationality enunciated in Barcelona Traction may be easy to disapply in particular
circumstances, it is almost impossible to reverse. The obvious way to reverse it
would be through the conclusion of a generalmultilateral treaty – as had happened
to the Lotus holding on jurisdiction.115 Yet the prospects of such an eventuality are
rather slim when the issue is as politically sensitive and divisive as the diplomatic
protection of corporations. By the same token, it is difﬁcult to imagine that the
Court’s dictum should be reversed by a body of international practice consistent
enough to give rise to the emergence of new rule of custom – especially if diverging
approaches can be explained as leges speciales. In short, Barcelona Traction suggests
that residual, default rules that admitof exceptionsare rather likely tomakea lasting
impact on the law.
3.4. Judicial pronouncements will shape the law if they take up a
societal demand
The preceding considerations highlight one particular feature of the Court’s state-
ment on nationality, but, in and of themselves, cannot explain the tremendous
113 Lauterpacht, supra note 5, at 189–90.
114 Supra, section 2.1.
115 Supra note 29.
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inﬂuence that both Barcelona Traction pronouncements have exercised. So itmay be
asked whether, despite their diversity, these two pronouncements share a common
trait that can explain their impact. It is submitted that, ultimately, both pronounce-
mentswere able to shape the lawbecause they responded to a clear societal demand.
With respect to the nationality of corporations, the international society, in 1970,
seemed to be in need of a general rule, which the Court provided. As noted above,
no general test governing the nationality of corporations had been accepted, hence
there was a gap in the law. Of course, not every gap in the law requires to be ﬁlled.
Yet where the gap concerns an issue as important and politically sensitive as the
diplomatic protection of corporations, there arguably is a societal demand for legal
certainty. In Barcelona Traction the Court responded to that need by laying down
a straightforward default rule that was relatively easy to apply, but admitted of
exceptions. Its pronouncement clariﬁed the state of the law in an important area
and thereby enhanced legal certainty. Conversely, it prompted states that considered
the default rule to be insufﬁcient or unacceptable to ‘contract out’ of it by way of
treaty. The Barcelona Traction case thus enunciated a general rule and indirectly
encouraged states to formulate special rules for special circumstances. As a result
of both factors, it succeeded in bringing at least a measure of legal certainty to a
hitherto rather underregulated area of international law.
The Court’s ‘other’ Barcelona Traction dictum, the pronouncement on obligations
erga omnes, fulﬁlled a very different function, but it, too, responded to a societal
demand. The Court’s dictum launched a concept that accommodated a generally
felt interest in some form of enforcement action in defence of community interests.
After the 1966 South West Africa judgment, international law was in need of such a
concept – one that sent a political signal, that reopened the door to the notion of
community interest, and that was broad enough (and maybe mysterious enough)
to be applied outside its initial ﬁeld of application. The Court, having felt the
repercussions of South West Africa, was keenly aware of this societal demand. By
‘inventing’ the erga omnes concept, it was able to translate it into a general legal
concept that would provide a framework for debates about law enforcement in
the public interest. It thereby not only responded to a societal demand, but also
‘[gave] general and articulate formulation to developments implicit, though as yet
not clearly accepted, in actual international custom or agreement of States’.116
The experiencewithbothpronouncements thus suggests that a judgment ismost
likely to shape the law if it responds to a societal demand or concern, and translates
this demand into legal form. This may seem trite, but it arguably constitutes the
most important ‘lesson’ that canbedrawn fromtheBarcelonaTraction case. Just as the
law more generally, so a speciﬁc pronouncement by the Court, cannot ‘be divorced
from the general framework of normative argument in the society within which
it operates’.117 As both of the Court’s pronouncements in this case were in line
with ‘general framework[s] of normative argument[s]’118 within the international
116 Lauterpacht, supra note 5, at 173.
117 V. Lowe, International Law (2007), 99.
118 Ibid.
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society, they were unlikely to be reversed through subsequent international law-
making (whether treaty or custom). Instead, they shaped the process of legal devel-
opment because states and other actors could be expected to ‘build practice around
them’119 – by applying the principles articulated or even by contracting out of, and
thus indirectly afﬁrming, them.
4. CONCLUSION: THE ICJ AS A POWERFUL AGENT OF LEGAL
DEVELOPMENT
To these, one has to add a ﬁfth and concluding observation. Even though it does
not make the law single-handedly, but merely participates in a broader process, the
Barcelona Traction case underlines the Court’s potential as a powerful agent of legal
development. The previous sections indicate that, when assessing the likely impact
of judicial decisions, one should not overly rely on intuitively acceptable rules of
thumb, but instead appreciate the Court’s interaction with the international legal
community. It can only be repeated: given the formal and functional limits placed
on the ICJ, its decisions only shape the law where they are taken up by other actors
engaged in the process of legal development. Talk about ‘judicial lawmaking’ tends
to obfuscate this obvious restriction on theCourt’s role. YetBarcelona Traction shows
that even though it is restrained by formal and functional factors, the Court has an
enormous potential to inﬂuence the process of legal development. In one judgment,
and without particularly convincing reasoning, the Court managed to lay down
a general rule on the nationality of corporations and articulate a novel concept
capable of explaining, justifying, and guiding international enforcement action in
defence of community interests. Either claim to fame would be sufﬁcient to make
Barcelona Traction an important decision. Two such achievements in one judgment
make it a landmark.
119 Boyle and Chinkin, supra note 12, at 301.
